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Abstract
Baselines are crucial to the deﬁnition of maritime claims and the delimitation of maritime
boundaries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) provides for
several distinct types of baseline. These various baselines are discussed relative to their practical
application over the past three decades. While some LOSC baseline provisions have proved to
be well drafted and have led to broad compliance, the loose language contained in other baselines Articles has resulted in their being interpreted liberally. Contemporary and emerging
trends and challenges are also highlighted.
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Introduction
A key achievement of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (LOSC) was that it established a clear framework for the limits of coastal
State claims to maritime jurisdiction. It is perhaps easy to forget that this was
no mean achievement given the lack of consensus on these issues in the course
of earlier eﬀorts at the codiﬁcation of the international law of the sea in 1958
and 1960.
The majority of such maritime claims are deﬁned by maximum breadth
limits, such as 12 nautical miles (nm) for the territorial sea and 200 nm for
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), measured from baselines along the coast.1
1

LOSC, Arts. 3 and 4 re the Territorial Sea and Art. 57 re the EEZ. While the delineation of
the outer limits of the continental shelf involves complex geophysical factors, distance
measurements from baselines, speciﬁcally the 200-nm and 350-nm limits, remain important.
LOSC, Article 76.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012
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Accordingly, baselines are critical to deﬁning the limits of national claims to
maritime jurisdiction. However, while the LOSC has delivered an admirable
measure of spatial certainty with respect to the maximum breadth of maritime
jurisdictional zones and, importantly, there has been a large measure of compliance with these international norms,2 where such zones are claimed from
has proved to be more open to interpretation.
This contribution addresses a deceptively straightforward question: where
does the land end and the sea begin? The LOSC dealt with this challenge by
providing for multiple distinct types of what are often termed ‘territorial sea
baselines’, regardless of the fact that they are relevant to the measurement of
the full suite of maritime zones claimable by coastal States. This diversity to a
large extent reﬂects the complexity of coastlines on a global scale. How, then,
have the LOSC provisions on baselines stood the test of time over the three
decades and what challenges and prospects can be envisaged for the future?

Normal Baselines
The predominant type of baseline in use by coastal States is the “normal”
baseline coincident with “the low-water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts oﬃcially recognized by the coastal State.”3 Such baselines
represent a coastal State’s ‘default’ baselines in that they require no formal
declaration or due publicity. The absence of a reference to a particular lowwater line in Article 5 of the LOSC implies that this choice is left up to the
coastal State.
The level of the low-water line forming the normal baseline is dependent
on the choice of vertical datum, that is, the level of reference for the measurement of depths and elevations. In this context, many States have tended to opt
for a particularly conservative vertical datum, such as lowest astronomical tide
(LAT),4 and thus low normal baselines. This is essentially because such a low
interpretation of the low-water line is preferable in the context of nautical
2
See United Nations Division of Ocean Aﬀairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), “Table
of claims to national jurisdiction”, as at 15 July 2011, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.pdf>.
3
LOSC, Article 5.
4
LAT is deﬁned as: “The lowest tide level which can be predicted to occur under average
meteorological conditions and under any combination of astronomical conditions.” See International Hydrographic Organization (with the International Oceanographic Commission and
the International Association of Geodesy), A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Special Publication no. 51, 4th edition (Monaco:
International Hydrographic Bureau, 2006) Chapter 2, p.18 (hereafter TALOS Manual).
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charting with a view to ensuring safety of navigation, leading to LAT being
adopted by the International Hydrographic Oﬃce (IHO) as the preferred
vertical datum for nautical charts. It is worth noting that use of a particularly
low vertical datum, such as LAT, also has the advantage of advancing the lowwater line further ‘down the beach’, as it were, thereby expanding and maximising the coastal State’s land territory and simultaneously potentially
enhancing the scope of its claims to maritime jurisdiction by advancing the
starting point for measuring its maritime claims.
The direct relationship between the position of normal baselines and the
limits of maritime jurisdiction is potentially and increasingly problematic,
however. This is the case because, just as the coast is dynamic and susceptible
to change over time, so too, inevitably, is the location of the low-water line.
The implication of this is that as normal baselines change or “ambulate” over
time, so too will the maritime jurisdictional limits measured from them should
the critical basepoints along that baseline upon which the outer limits of maritime claims depend be aﬀected.5
While the inherently unstable nature of many coasts and, therefore, of normal low-water-line baselines has long been recognised, the advent of climate
change and, particularly, signiﬁcant sea level rise have led to suggestions that
normal baselines, and thus the maritime spaces under national jurisdiction
measured from them, are under increasing threat.6 Such concerns arise from
the likelihood that, in general terms, should sea levels rise, the low-water line
will inevitably retreat inland. Coastal States possessing signiﬁcant areas of
heavily populated low-lying territory, as well as small island States, may therefore be faced with a twin threat, not only of inundation of land territory, but
also the diminution of their maritime claims and thus of rights over the valuable marine resources contained therein. A further, even direr threat that has
been posited is the total inundation of certain low-lying States and consequent
loss of Statehood. While such concerns are not to be blithely dismissed, they
5

M.W. Reed, Shore and sea boundaries: the development of international maritime boundary
principles through United States practice (US Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.,
2000) 185.
6
These issues were ﬁrst raised in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by Bird and Prescott, Caron,
Freestone and Soons. See F. Bird and J.R.V. Prescott, “Rising Global Sea Levels and National
Maritime Claims” (1989) 177 Marine Policy Reports 177–96; D.D. Caron, “When Law Makes
Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of Baselines in light of Rising Sea Level” (1990)
17 Ecology Law Quarterly 621–653; D. Freestone, “International Law and Sea Level Rise”,
in R.R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds.) International Law and Global Climate Change
(London/Dordrecht, Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 1991) pp. 109–125; and
A.H.A. Soons, “The Eﬀects of Sea Level Rise on Maritime Limits and Boundaries” (1990) 37
Netherlands International Law Review 207–232.
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do not appear to be likely in the short- to medium-term.7 The spatially and
temporally uneven character of sea level rise should also be borne in mind in
this context.8
In this context it can be observed that while the multi-faceted challenges
posed by climate change and sea level rise were apparently not anticipated by
the drafters of the Convention, they nonetheless proved themselves to be open
to the ﬁxing of baselines and limits under certain circumstances—notably
with regard to unstable coasts, outer continental shelf limits, and also maritime boundaries.9
Although there have been suggestions that this challenge could be met
through a range of measures, such as a UN General Assembly Resolution, a
supplementary agreement to the Convention analogous to, for example, the
Fish Stocks Agreement, or even amendment of the Convention itself,10 the
most likely avenue in this regard would appear to be through unilateral State
practice. In particular, threatened coastal States might opt unilaterally to
declare the location of their normal baselines and/or the limits of the maritime zones derived from them.11

Straight-line Departures from the Coast
The LOSC also provides for several ‘departures from the coast’ in terms of
baselines deﬁned by straight lines, as an alternative to normal, low-waterline baselines. The general objective of these provisions is to recognise and
address coastal complexity through approximation or generalisation of the
low-water line. These include straight baselines (LOSC, Article 7), river
closing lines (Article 9), bay closing lines (Article 10), the use of the outermost
7
See, for example, A. Webb and P. Kench, “The dynamic response of reef islands to sea-level
rise: Evidence from multi-decadal analysis of island change in the Central Paciﬁc” (2010) 72
Global and Planetary Change 234–246.
8
See, for example, Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Executive Summary,
Chapter 5: Observations: Oceanic Climate Change and Sea Level, Contribution of Working
Group I, “The Physical Science Basis”, to the IPCC 4th Assessment Report 2007, available at:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch5s5-es.html.
9
See LOSC Articles 7(2) and 76(8). Boundary treaties are not subject to change even in the
case of “subsequent fundamental change of circumstances.” See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155, 331(VCLT); Article 62(2)(a).
10
Moritaka Hayashi, “Sea Level Rise and the Law of the Sea: Legal and Policy Options”, in
Hiroshi Terashima (ed.), Proceedings of The International Symposium of Islands and Oceans
(Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Tokyo, 2009) 90.
11
C.H. Schoﬁeld, “Rising Waters, Shrinking States: The Potential Impacts of Sea Level Rise
on Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction” (2010) 53 German Yearbook of International Law (Berlin,
Buncker and Humbolt, 2011) pp. 189–231, at p. 229.

C. Schoﬁeld /
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27 (2012) 723–732

727

permanent harbour works of ports (Article 11), and in respect of archipelagic
states (Article 47).
Expansive claims to straight baselines in particular have been the dominant
theme over the past three decades. Such excessive claims arise from the lack of
objective tests within Article 7 of the Convention, which has therefore been
open to varied interpretation. Article 7 of the LOSC allows coastal States to
deﬁne systems of straight baselines “where the coastline is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate
vicinity.” Unfortunately, Article 7 contains no indication as to the depth or
frequency of such deep indentations or cuts into the coast line needed for a
particular stretch of coastline to qualify for the application of straight baselines or, alternatively, how many, how close to one another and how far oﬀshore fringing islands need to be.12
While the intention of Article 7, that is, to allow for the simpliﬁcation or
approximation of especially complex coasts, may be clear, its practical implementation has proved to be highly problematic with much State practice that
can be deemed excessive in character. Indeed, the loose terminology and criteria contained in Article 7 led one leading commentator to observe in the
aftermath of the Convention being opened for signature that: “the imprecise
language [of Article 7] would allow any coastal country, anywhere in the
world, to draw straight baselines along its coast.”13
This statement has proved to be prescient as it seems that many coastal
States have interpreted Article 7 to their maximum advantage. The vast majority of what can be regarded as excessive straight baseline claims remain on the
books and have not been ‘rolled back’. This is despite the vigorous eﬀorts of,
in particular, the United States Freedom of Navigation (FON) program.14
Support for the more conservative view advocated by the United States, among
others, can also be found in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision
in the Qatar/Bahrain case, which stated unequivocally that the method of
straight baselines in accordance with Article 7 of the LOSC “must be applied
restrictively.”15
12

The U.S. Department of State has issued guidelines on the application of Article 7 but, as
the study itself states, such guidelines “do not have international standing as benchmarks” for
testing the legality of straight baselines systems. See United States Department of State,
“Developing Standard Guidelines for Evaluating Straight Baselines”, Limits in the Seas,
No. 106 (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientiﬁc Aﬀairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, D.C.: 31 August 1987).
13
J.R.V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Methuen, London, 1985), 64.
14
See J.A. Roach, R.W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (Martinus
Nijhoﬀ Publishers, The Hague, 1996) pp. 57–146.
15
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahrain) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 40 (paras. 212–215).
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Arguably many of the more liberal interpretations of Article 7 of the LOSC
stem from a desire by coastal States to position themselves ahead of negotiations
on the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Indeed, there is evidence of titfor-tat declarations of straight baselines with the aim of achieving balance in
relations between maritime neighbours ahead of such discussions. Here it can
be remarked that the existence of clearly excessive straight baseline claims has
not, in fact, prevented coastal States from resolving their overlapping maritime jurisdictional claims, which are at least partially attributable to baseline
issues, through boundary delimitation. In such cases the straight baselines in
question tend to cancel one another out.16 Furthermore, despite many excessive straight baseline systems remaining on the books, it is uncertain whether
they are actually observed or enforced, so their practical impact on freedom of
navigation remains unclear. While not dismissing the potential signiﬁcance of
such claims, it can be observed that they may in practice have something of a
symbolic or even illusory character. Nonetheless, in light of the extreme reluctance on the part of coastal States to revise and pull back their more expansive
claims shown to date, excessive straight baselines would appear likely to be a
prominent feature of maritime practice for the foreseeable future.

Alternative Departures
In contrast to the considerable uncertainties that undermine the LOSC provisions on straight baselines, those relating to bays and archipelagic baselines
provide clear, objective tests whereby it can be determined whether a particular set of baselines are compliant with international law or not. As such, these
provisions have largely withstood the test of time.
The LOSC provisions relating to river closing lines have predominantly not
been abused.17 Similarly, the use of outermost harbour works to form part of
the coastal State’s composite baseline has similarly proved to be largely
uncontroversial.18 Furthermore, although it might be argued that the inclu16
For example, Thailand and Vietnam. See C.H. Schoﬁeld and M. Tan-Mullins (2008)
‘Claims, Conﬂicts and Cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand’, Ocean Yearbook 22 (Martinus
Nijhoﬀ, Leiden/Boston, 2008) pp. 75–116, at p. 88; and, N.H. Thao, “Vietnam’s First Maritime
Boundary Agreement” (1997) 5(3) Boundary and Security Bulletin 74–78, at 76–77.
17
A notable exception to this general rule is provided by Argentina and Uruguay’s claimed
closing line across the mouth of the Rio de la Plata measuring 135 miles in length. See Roach
and Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, pp. 143–144.
18
But see the ICJ’s treatment of the Sulina Dyke in respect of the delimitation of maritime
boundaries in the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), (3 February 2009), I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61, paras. 132–141.
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sion of a reference to historic bays within Article 10 of the LOSC detracts
from the otherwise laudably precise language of the rest of the Article and, in
particular, the inclusion of the semi-circle test19 as well as the length limitation
on bay closing lines,20 in practice there does not appear to have been a major
proliferation of historic bay claims and some notable ones, such as that relating to the Gulf of Sirte, have been rolled back.21
With respect to archipelagic baselines, the inclusion of the land/water ratio
requirement22 and of a maximum length (125 nm) for individual archipelagic
baseline segments23 within Article 47 of the LOSC provides objective tests
against which archipelagic baselines can be readily assessed. This, in turn, has
ensured a signiﬁcant degree of compliance. That said, these apparently clear
rules have yielded some rather unexpected results with both Jamaica and São
Tomé and Príncipe, which might not be obviously considered as archipelagic
States, fulﬁlling the requirements of Article 47 of the LOSC.

Baselines and Boundaries
An intimate connection exists between baselines and the delimitation of maritime boundaries. This arises from the critical role of baselines in the construction of equidistance lines. With respect to the delimitation of territorial sea
boundaries, median lines are explicitly mentioned in Article 15 of the LOSC.
In contrast, the LOSC provisions related to the delimitation of continental
shelf and EEZ boundaries are silent regarding a preferred method of delimitation and oﬀer only limited guidance.24 In practice, however, the equidistance
method has proved to be overwhelmingly popular in the delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ boundaries also.
19

LOSC, Article 10(2).
LOSC, Article 10(4).
21
This apparent progress is qualiﬁed, however, as Libya’s Gulf of Sirte historic bay closing line
was simply replaced with the world’s longest single segment of claimed straight baselines. See
“General People’s Committee Decision No.104 of the year 1373 from the death of the Prophet
(AD 2005) concerning straight baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea and
maritime zones of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of
the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
18 August 2005, reproduced in United Nations Division of Ocean Aﬀairs and the Law of the
Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.59 (2005), pp. 15–18, available at: <http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin59e.pdf>.
22
LOSC, Article 47(1).
23
LOSC, Article 47(2).
24
Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC call for agreement to be reached on the basis of international
law in order to achieve “an equitable solution.”
20
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Indeed, the drafting of the LOSC and, especially, the introduction of the
200-nm EEZ led to a signiﬁcant shift in ocean boundary-making. Taking
their cue from these “new developments in international law”, namely the
introduction of the EEZ concept by the 1982 text, the ICJ held that where
the parties’ coastlines are less than 400 nm apart, “the geological and geomorphological characteristics of those areas . . . are completely immaterial.”25 International courts and tribunals have subsequently evolved an increasingly clear
approach to the delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, generally termed the ‘equidistance/special circumstances approach’. In particular, in
the Black Sea case (2009), the ICJ articulated a three-stage approach to the
delimitation.26 This process comprises: ﬁrst, the construction of a provisional
delimitation line based on equidistance; second, consideration of any factors
that might lead to a modiﬁcation of the provisional line with a view to achieving an equitable result; and, third, undertaking a (dis)proportionality test.27
The ICJ stated that “[i]n keeping with its settled jurisprudence on maritime
delimitation”,28 a provisional delimitation line should be established using
geometrically objective methods, and “an equidistance line will be drawn
unless there are compelling reasons that make this unfeasible in the particular
case” [emphasis added].29 This three-stage approach to the delimitation of
continental shelf and EEZ boundaries was also adopted by the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in its delimitation case between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, underscoring the importance
of this development in the approach to the delimitation of international maritime boundaries.30
The consequence of these evolutions in the approach to ocean boundarymaking is to reinforce the role and signiﬁcance of baselines. In order to construct a provisional delimitation line based on equidistance, baselines, or more
speciﬁcally key basepoints along such baselines, are critical. That said, it is
notable that international Courts and Tribunals have proved to be selective in
their choice of appropriate basepoints for the construction of provisional
25

Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment of 3 June
1985, [1985] I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13 (hereinafter the Libya/Malta case), para. 39.
26
Ibid., paras. 118–122.
27
Black Sea case, paras. 118–122.
28
Ibid., para. 118.
29
Ibid., para. 116.
30
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar
in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), Case no. 16, Judgment, 14 March 2012, para. 233, available at, <http://www.itlos
.org/ﬁleadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1-C16_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf>
[hereinafter Bay of Bengal case].
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equidistance-based delimitation lines. Rather than employing strict equidistance lines, both the ICJ31 and the ITLOS32 have opted to discount certain
island basepoints prior to drawing the provisional equidistance line. In the
Black Sea case the ICJ eliminated the use of Serpents’ Island as a basepoint
prior to construction of the provisional boundary line, arguing that to use this
small island as a basepoint would amount to “a judicial refashioning of
geography”.33 The ITLOS advanced analogous arguments, citing the Black
Sea case, as the basis for its treatment of St. Martin’s Island in the delimitation
of the continental shelf and EEZ boundary in the Bay of Bengal case.34
While these decisions are arguably consistent with a general welcome trend
in judicial decisions towards awarding small and frequently sparsely or uninhabited islands a much reduced impact on maritime boundary delimitation,
the manner in which the discounting of certain island basepoints has been
achieved through the qualiﬁed application of the equidistance method is arguably problematic and undermines the three-stage process.35 After all, overtly
ignoring potentially critical basepoints and thereby departing from strict equidistance as a starting point, itself necessarily represents a “judicial refashioning
of geography” that serves to undermine the clarity and consistency of the
three-stage process.

Trends and Challenges
Baselines remain crucial both to the delineation of the deﬁnition of the spatial
limits to maritime jurisdictional zones and the delimitation of equidistancebased maritime boundaries. The LOSC provides for several types of baseline
in recognition of the complexity of coastlines worldwide. A number of these
provisions include clear, objective rules and have consequently withstood the
test of time over the past three decades in admirable fashion, as exempliﬁed by
broad compliance with their terms in State practice. However, a number of
the baseline Articles contained in the LOSC have fared less well with respect
to their implementation. This is particularly the case with regard to straight
baselines, which have proved to be the focus for excessive practice over the
past three decades. Although such expansive claims are unlikely to disappear
in the foreseeable future given the great reluctance shown by coastal States to
31
32
33
34
35

In respect of the Filﬂa in the Libya/Malta case and Serpents’ Island in the Black Sea case.
In relation to St Martin’s Island in the Bay of Bengal case.
Black Sea case, para. 149.
Bay of Bengal case, para. 265.
St. Martin’s Island is 8 km2 in area, with a population of c.7,000 people. Ibid., para. 143.
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pull back from even their most clearly excessive practices, the overall trend
has been to award such extreme claims no eﬀect, notably in the delimitation
of maritime boundaries. Contemporary and future baselines issues are likely
to feature ongoing attempts to reel in and moderate excessive claims and
potentially also to ﬁx the location of normal baselines and/or the limits derived
therefrom in light of the threats posed by sea level rise. Deﬁning the interface
between the land and the sea is therefore likely to remain a distinctly challenging proposition.

